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The outlook for Europe's external relations has never looked so uncertain in the post-
cold war era. A series of internal and external shocks – from the Eurozone crisis to the 
UK’s Brexit referendum and civil wars and external interventions on Europe’s 
borders – have shaken the EU to its foundations. Against a backdrop of external 
insecurity and global power shifts abroad, and institutional crisis and strategic drift at 
home, this article introduces the main themes and questions that guide the 
contributions to this special issue: First, how have recent transformations of the 
international system – declining Western dominance, a shift from unipolarity to 
multipolarity, and the return of geopolitical competition – affected Europe’s search 
for stability, security and influence in global affairs? Second, how have external 
perceptions of the EU's position, power and influence in global affairs changed in 
recent years, particularly in response to ongoing crises in the EU’s internal 
governance? And third, how can the EU respond to the dramatically altered external 
environment and newly arising threats, and to what extent does the new EU Global 




European foreign policy; EU Global Strategy; Brexit; Geopolitics; Multipolarity; 





The outlook for Europe's external relations has never looked so uncertain in the post-
cold war era. A series of internal and external shocks have shaken the EU to its 
foundations. Internally, the global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis 
have caused severe economic dislocation. Europe’s single currency, once hailed as the 
pinnacle of European integration, is now regarded by many as an economic liability 
and a potential source of future disintegration. The EU may have so far managed to 
avoid the breakup of the Eurozone, but the UK's referendum vote in favour of exiting 
the EU (‘Brexit') has revealed just how fragile Europe’s project of ‘ever closer union’ 
has become. After successive rounds of EU enlargement, the Union is facing for the 
first time in its history the prospect of losing a member state. Externally, widening 
tensions in the Middle East, civil war in Syria, the Ukraine crisis and the rise of a 
revisionist Russia have undermined the EU's long-standing desire to create a ring of 
stable neighbouring countries on its southern and eastern flank. Further afield, global 
geopolitical changes are accelerating as the rise of emerging powers is eroding the 
West's dominant position in the international system. Even the transatlantic 
relationship has been thrown into doubt. With the election of Donald J. Trump as the 
45th President of the United States, a deep rift has opened between the US and many 
European countries that is forcing European leaders to rethink the continent’s 
international position and global security strategy. 
 The change in perceptions of Europe's strategic position could hardly have 
been more dramatic. Just over a decade ago, some analysts speculated about the 
European Dream 'quietly eclipsing the American Dream' (Rifkin 2004) and the EU 
emerging as the 'next superpower' that will shape the global order in the twenty-first 
century (Leonard 2005). In contrast, more recent assessments of Europe’s economic 
and political model provide a decidedly gloomier outlook (Merritt 2016; Gillingham 
2016; Rachman 2016). The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are widely seen 
as 'real threats to the Union's long-standing objective of facilitating a zone of peace, 
stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood' (Mueller 2016, 359), with many analysts 
declaring the European Neighbourhood Policy 'dead' (Tocci 2014). To make matters 
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worse, European leaders are found to be lacking in strategic foresight and unable to 
forge a common position. As Howorth and Menon argue,  
 
European policy-makers and commentators have largely engaged in a display 
of collective hand wringing rather than a process of strategic reflection. At the 
heart of the problem is the reluctance particularly of larger European states to 
confront the fact that their individual ability to address the various challenges 
facing them is diminishing. The challenges posed by today's world require a 
coherent collective European response' (2015, 11). 
 
Against this backdrop of external insecurity and global power shifts abroad, 
and institutional crisis and strategic drift at home, this special issue takes stock of 
Europe's external relations with major powers and regions that are critical to the 
continent’s future. It asks three interconnected questions: first, how have recent 
transformations of the international system – declining Western dominance, a shift 
from unipolarity to multipolarity, and the return of geopolitical competition – affected 
Europe’s search for stability, security and influence in global affairs? Second, how 
have external perceptions of the EU's position, power and influence in global affairs 
changed in recent years, particularly in response to ongoing crises in the EU’s internal 
governance? And third, how can the EU respond to the dramatically altered external 
environment and newly arising threats, and to what extent does the new EU Global 
Strategy of 2016 meet the challenges that the continent faces?  
The contributions to this special issue originate from a two-year research 
project conducted under the auspices of the Dahrendorf Forum, an international 
collaboration between the Hertie School of Governance, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator. The project examined 
Europe’s external relations with major powers and regions that are of strategic 
importance to the continent: the United States, Russia and China as major global 
powers in the new multipolar order of the twenty-first century; and Turkey and the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as critical, and increasingly 
troublesome, neighbours to the south and south east of Europe.  
This special issue brings together leading scholars from international relations, 
political science, history and area studies to analyse the changing context in which 
Europe’s strategic reorientation is taking place. Two contributions examine the larger 
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structural forces in the international system that serve to constrain Europe’s room for 
manoeuvre: the enduring geopolitical conflict between the United States and Russia, 
which is limiting Europe’s options for constructive engagement with an increasingly 
assertive and revisionist Russia (contribution by Wohlforth and Zubok); and the 
erosion of domestic support for neoliberal policies and economic globalization that is 
putting a strain on the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe 
(contribution by Burgoon, Oliver and Trubowitz). Two contributions focus on the 
crises that have afflicted Europe’s relations with its Islamic neighbours to the South 
and Southeast: the fragmentation and dissolution of Middle Eastern and North African 
states after the Arab Spring, which has shown up Europe’s failure to promote peaceful 
democratic change and stability in its Neighbourhood (contribution by Harders, 
Juenemann and Khatib); and Europe’s increasingly fraught relationship with Turkey, 
a long-standing Western ally that plays a critical role in the Syrian war and fight 
against ISIS (contribution by Keyman). A further contribution examines the political 
sensitivities involved in the increasingly close economic relationship between Europe 
and China, as is evident from the growing contention over Chinese foreign investment 
in Europe (contribution by Gippner and Rabe).  
The special issue also considers the constraints on EU foreign and security 
policy and the options for developing Europe’s global strategy. The first European 
Security Strategy (ESS) was launched in 2003, at a time when the European Union 
was in a comparatively strong position, preparing for a big enlargement push in 
central and eastern Europe. Thirteen years later, a new European Union Global 
Strategy (EUGS) was agreed in 2016 in response to a dramatically altered 
international environment. The new strategy, launched right after the UK’s decision to 
seek an exit from the EU, is set within the context of a serious deterioration of the 
EU’s security position, with an ‘arc of instability’ now surrounding the Union. Two 
contributions to this special issue examine the new EU Global Strategy, with a focus 
on how it was agreed (contribution by Tocci) and whether it meets the expectations of 
a strategic document (contribution by Smith). The final contribution examines 
Britain’s referendum vote to withdraw from the EU and how it will affect external 
perceptions of Europe’s international position (contribution by Oliver).  
The remainder of this introductory article sets the scene for this special issue 
by framing the central questions that have guided the individual contributions. The 
first section reviews the transformation that the international system has undergone 
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since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The next section considers changes in 
the external perception of the EU as an international actor. The subsequent section 
discusses the scope for European agency amidst an increasingly hostile international 
structure. And the final section introduces the main themes and arguments of the 
contributions to this special issue. 
 
The international context: multipolarity, insecurity and the return of 
geopolitics 
 
The first question that animates this special issue concerns the changes in the external 
environment that Europe faces: how have global power shifts, declining Western 
dominance and the transition from an unipolar to an increasingly multipolar structure 
affected Europe’s search for global stability and security? How has the return of a 
geopolitical logic in great power relations impacted on Europe’s ability to shape 
international outcomes? That the international system has undergone a profound 
transformation since the early 2000s, when the EU’s first Global Strategy was 
produced, is widely acknowledged (see contribution by Tocci). What remains unclear, 
however, is the extent to which Europe’s strategic position has deteriorated as a 
consequence of these global changes, and whether and how the EU can respond to 
these external challenges. As several contributors to this special issue argue, the 
outlook for Europe’s security has weakened and Europe’s influence and standing on 
the global stage have declined as a consequence of the seismic shifts in international 
relations.  
It has almost become a truism to argue that the international order is entering a 
new era in the twenty-first century. The rise of emerging powers from the Global 
South is bringing to an end the dominant position that the United States and its 
Western allies have enjoyed during the twentieth century (for a critical review of this 
debate, see Cox 2012). This global transformation, invariably referred to as the ‘rise 
of the Rest’ (Zakaria 2008), a global ‘power shift’ towards Asia (Mahbubani 2008) or 
simply ‘Easternisation’ (Rachman 2016), caps the end of what, with hindsight, looks 
like a historical anomaly:  that Western powers were able first to colonize and later to 
rule large parts of the planet for over two centuries, largely based on the technological 
advantage that the industrial revolution had given them (Buzan and Lawson 2015). As 
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the large and populous societies of the Global South are catching up with the West, 
both economically and militarily, it is only a question of time before they can claim 
their rightful place in a refashioned international order. There is still uncertainty as to 
whether any single emerging power can replace the United States as the world’s 
hegemon or whether US predominance will give way to a state of multipolarity 
(Posen 2009). However, few would dispute that the ongoing shift in economic 
strength will produce a corresponding shift in the distribution of political and military 
power. 
 
Against this background of a dramatic sea change in international relations, Europe 
can no longer assume that the benign context of Pax Americana, the US-led 
international order of the post-1945 era, will persist into the future. For a brief time 
after the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet empire seemed to reaffirm the 
universal appeal of Western liberal values. But Western triumphalism was short-lived 
and has given way to growing concerns over the effects of declining US and Western 
influence (Layne 2012). In Europe, too, uncertainty over the future of the 
international order has unsettled long-standing views about the continent’s main 
strategic challenges. Whereas at the time of the 2003 European Security Strategy it 
was America’s assertive unilateralism under President George W. Bush that unnerved 
Europe’s political elite, today it is American decline and disengagement, combined 
with growing great power competition, that threaten to undermine Europe’s vision of 
a rule-governed, multilateral, international order. If anything, the election of US 
President Donald Trump and his promise to ‘Make America great again’ has 
deepened European anxieties regarding the future role that the US is going to play 
internationally.  
 
The decline in Western influence is not only the result of the ‘rise of rest’ and the 
emergence of a more multipolar distribution of power. It also reflects a deeper crisis 
in the liberal political-economic model that both the United States and Europe have 
espoused since 1945. In the economic sphere, the West’s ideological hegemony has 
been challenged by the success of rising economies, most notably China, that seek to 
avail of the opportunities of an open global economy while constraining the 
development of liberal capitalism domestically. The once widely accepted 
Washington Consensus, an amalgam of liberal policy instruments intended to reform 
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developing countries, has long lost its sparkle as a recipe for economic success. Since 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, 
many countries in the Global South have followed heterodox economic policies, with 
the leading emerging countries in particular rejecting liberal economic orthodoxy 
(Ban and Blyth 2013). The Washington Consensus may not have been replaced by a 
new, alternative, developmental model – despite China’s astonishing economic 
growth record, the much talked-about ‘Beijing Consensus’ simply did not materialize 
(Wiliamson 2012). But now that the vulnerabilities of the Western capitalist system 
have been exposed, the gospel of liberal market economics no longer carries much 
credibility around the world. This has important consequences for Europe and its 
desire to shape the multilateral international order, which is increasingly characterised 
not only by a diffusion of power but also by greater diversity of political-economic 
interests and values.  
The predominance of Western liberalism has also been challenged by the 
persistence of authoritarian rule around the world. After the end of the Cold War, 
globalization was widely seen to have rendered obsolete systems of political and 
social organization that are built on a defence of national identity, cohesion and 
sovereignty. The then dominant ideology of liberal internationalism assumed that 
global convergence towards political liberalization and democracy would help build 
an open, liberal, international order. But despite the success of the so-called Third 
Wave of democratization at the end of the twentieth century, the global spread of 
democratic practices and values appears to have come to a halt. While some countries 
that underwent political liberalization ended up in a state of arrested democratization 
or saw early democratic gains disappear as illiberal democracy took root, others 
experienced the stabilization, and even strengthening, of authoritarian rule (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2016). The resilience of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century has 
dashed Western hopes of making democratization a cornerstone of the new 
international order (Klaas 2016). In the case of the European Union, it has also shown 
the futility of basing security on the global spread of democracy. Unsurprisingly, the 
confident assertion in the European Security Strategy of 2003 that ‘[t]he best 
protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’ has not 
made it into the new EU Global Strategy of 2016.  
Barely two decades into the twenty-first century, Europe thus faces a series of 
international changes that challenge its long-standing assumption that international 
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stability and prosperity rest on the continuation of Western dominance built around 
US hegemony. Europe needs to reassess the altered global environment in order to 
arrive at a viable strategy for securing the continent’s place within a changing 
international order. This special issue seeks to contribute to the process of strategic re-
orientation by identifying some of the drivers of international change that impinge on 
Europe’s quest for global influence and security.  
 
Images of Europe: Outside Perceptions of a Continent in Crisis 
 
The second question that informs this special issue concerns the way outsiders view 
Europe’s position in the international system: how have external perceptions of 
Europe’s power and influence in global affairs changed in recent years, particularly in 
response to ongoing crises in the EU’s internal governance? And to what extent do 
external perceptions of Europe match European self-perceptions?  
In the past, the study of European foreign policy has been characterized by a 
distinctive ‘inside-out’ perspective that focuses on the EU's internal identity, interests 
and institutional structure and how these internal characteristics give rise to a 
distinctive approach to pursuing European interests and values abroad. A more recent 
research literature has begun to challenge this established framing by shifting the 
focus towards what might be described as an ‘outside-in’ perspective. Onar and 
Nicolaïdis, for example, advocate a 'paradigm shift that decenters the study and 
practice of Europe's international relations' (2013, 283), while Niemann and 
Bretherton urge scholars to go beyond the 'tendency in EU Studies to exaggerate the 
uniqueness of the EU' that has left the EU '(analytically) insulated from wider IR 
themes and the foreign policies of other "powers"' (2013, 263). Viewing Europe's 
international position from an ‘outside-in’ perspective involves two analytical moves: 
first, rather than treating Europe foreign policy primarily as a reflection of the EU's 
internal constitution and an outflow of Europe’s internal interests and values, it places 
greater emphasis on understanding how Europe's international role is shaped by the 
structural environment that it finds itself in; and second, the de-centering agenda 
involves paying closer attention to other international actors’ perceptions of EU 
interests, values and power, how these perceptions vary across different issue areas, 
and how such perceptions have changed over time.  
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One strand of this ‘outside-in’ literature is aimed at identifying the two-way 
flows of influence in Europe's engagement with the outside world. Whereas much of 
the literature on the EU’s foreign policy identity tends to focus on how the EU shapes 
international society - by exporting norms, policy solutions or governance models - 
more recent studies have emphasised the limitations of EU norm and policy export 
and the degree to which Europe is at the receiving end of external policy influences. 
In their 'integrative framework of EU-global interaction', for example, Müller et al. 
(2014) highlight four different ways in which the EU is connected to, and embedded 
in, global regimes. Their framework includes the traditional perspective on EU 'policy 
export' to the global level, which as the authors note is 'a demanding phenomenon 
occurring much less frequently than is commonly assumed' (2014, 1102-3). It also 
includes processes of 'policy promotion', where the EU promotes policies that do not 
conform with its internal policy environment; 'policy protection', where the EU 
defends domestic policies from external pressure for change; and 'policy import', 
where Europe itself is the recipient of international policy solutions (ibid.). What 
emerges from this typology of engagement patterns is a more nuanced and 
empirically rich picture of how the EU engages with the outside world and how in 
turn it is being shaped by external forces.  
A second line of research has focused on the empirical study of external 
perceptions of the EU in global affairs. Rather than study European understandings of 
the EU's values and interests in a global context and how these are pursued 
internationally, this research has sought to examine how 'images of the EU vary 
depending on the issue at hand and across regions' (Chaban et al. 2013, 433). Several 
research teams have undertaking comparative studies that survey external perceptions 
(Lucarelli 2007; Chaban and Holland 2008; Chaban et al. 2009; Lucarelli and 
Fioramonti 2010). Usually based on elite interviews (Chaban et al. 2013) or discourse 
analysis (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010), researchers in this tradition have 
highlighted that perceptions of EU leadership and power are 'highly issue-specific' 
and also vary from region to region (Chaban et al. 2013, 446-7). They also 
demonstrate that the established representation of the EU as a different international 
actor that transcends more conventional interest calculations are not matched by 
outside perceptions (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010, 222-3).  
A third line of enquiry has produced a more fundamental challenge to the 
established 'inside-out' framing of EU external relations and has called for a radical 
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'decentring' of Europe. In their introduction to a special issue of Cooperation and 
Conflict, Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013) set out an agenda for 'decentring' or 
'provincialising' Europe that draws on the postcolonial intellectual tradition. 
Critiquing the 'normative power' perspective as 'a sophisticated version of the "EU-
centric" narrative' (284), they call for a paradigm shift that takes the historical legacies 
of Euro-centrism and European colonialism seriously. Their decentring agenda 
involves three interrelated moves at both an empirical and a normative level: 
'provincializing' Europe, which questions Eurocentric accounts of world politics and 
questions the civilisational assumptions made in conventional Eurocentric 
perspectives; 'engaging' non-European perspectives, which pays empirical attention to 
outside perspectives and pursues an engagement with others on their own terms; and 
'reconstruction', which explores alternative ways of re-imagining Europe beyond 
Eurocentrism and gives rise to alternative approaches to external relations on the basis 
of mutuality and empowerment (ibid., 286-96). Taken together, the various strands of 
the postcolonial turn seek to bridge the gap between European Studies and 
International Relations in the study of EU external relations, positioning the debate on 
European power in a global comparative context. 
This is not to suggest that the conventional ‘inside-out perspective’ on EU 
foreign policy has become redundant. Insofar as the European Union remains a 
unique political actor in international affairs, its internal composition, decision-
making processes and foreign policy identity continue to deserve special scholarly 
attention. The sui generis nature of the EU has important implications for how the EU 
interacts with other countries and regions, as has been highlighted in research on the 
EU enlargement process (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Lavenex 2004) and 
European Neighbourhood Policy (Smith 2005; Kelley 2006); the diffusion of the 
European integration model to other regions (Grugel 2004; Lenz 2012); and the 
export of regulatory standards to other countries and global governance institutions 
(Bach and Newman 2007; Telò 2009; Damro 2012). In all these areas of EU foreign 
policy, the EU seeks to shape the external environment based on policy models that 
originate in Europe, and it remains important to understand the internal drivers of 
such international policy export. But in an age of rapid and profound international 
transformation, the question of how internal dynamics of European foreign policy 
interact with external drivers of international change gains a new urgency.  
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It also remains the case that the actorness of the EU in international affairs 
cannot be taken for granted, despite recent institutional developments that have 
strengthened its foreign policy role. For many international relations scholars, the 
central puzzle has always been that the EU, although not a state in the traditional 
sense, has managed to gradually expand its presence in global affairs. EU actorness 
depends on several factors: the legal authority to represent EU member States at the 
international level; the internal foreign policy coherence of the union and its ability to 
speak with one voice; the existence of a sufficiently effective institutional framework 
to conduct external relations and the availability of certain foreign policy tools; and 
external recognition by other international actors, most notably states and 
international organisations. In this context, recent research has demonstrated a 
significant strengthening of the EU's actorness, not least through successive treaty 
changes including most recently with the Lisbon Treaty (for an overview, see Smith 
2014). However, in an international system that is transitioning from US dominance 
and unipolarity towards multipolarity and great power rivalry, and that is 
characterized by a more fractured and regionalized security environment, new 
questions about the EU’s actorness are bound to arise.  
The inside-out perspective has also been dominant in the other major scholarly 
debate on Europe’s international role, which accepts that the EU has gained certain 
actor-type qualities but is focused on its identity as an international actor, the interests 
that it pursues and the types of instruments that it uses to achieve its objectives. This 
debate is organised around the claim that the EU is a different kind of international 
actor, a 'normative power' (Manners 2002) that seeks to shape international order in 
ways that set it apart from conventional powers in international society. Proponents of 
the normative power thesis argue that the EU is not aspiring to become a ‘normal’ 
great power but is instead seeking to promote a distinctive set of values and interests 
that are universal in nature (Manners 2006, 176). Being a post-Westphalian actor that 
has transcended the zero-sum logic of power politics, the EU pursues a different 
global order policy: working through 'ideas, opinions and conscience' (Diez and 
Manners 2007, 175), its diplomatic efforts are directed towards "the promotion and 
maintenance of negotiated order as a key approach to global governance" (Smith 
2013) and the 'strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, 
emphasising the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign 
equality' (Sjursen, 2006: 249).  
 12 
The normative power argument has been criticised from several different 
angles: Sjursen (2006) points to conceptual weaknesses, particularly with regard to 
the criteria and assessment standards for distinguishing normative from other forms of 
power. Bicchi (2006) questions the reflexivity and inclusiveness of the EU's approach 
to promoting global norms. Hyde-Price (2008) argues that its supposed championing 
of universal values and interests merely masks the pursuit of self-interest, while 
Falkner (2007) identifies political-economic interest constellations at the domestic 
level as more important foreign policy drivers than European values and identity. 
More recently, scholars have also taken aim at the Eurocentric nature of the 
‘normative power’ concept, with a growing body of research arguing that EU self-
perceptions of normative power do not necessarily match perceptions by other actors, 
especially in the Global South (Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2008; Fioramonti and Poletti 
2008), or fail to achieve their desired impact (Tocci 2008). The introspective nature of 
the concept is clearly evident in Manners' original definition: normative power is said 
to derive primarily from the EU's internal constitution, identity and historical context 
(2002, 240-1), and the "most important factor shaping the international role of the EU 
is not what it does or what it says but what it is" (Manners, 2002, p. 252).  
Although this special issue does not re-open the question of EU actorness and 
foreign policy identity as such, several papers seek to bring in external perspectives 
into the debate on the changing nature of Europe's external relations. They share an 
interest in reviewing EU-global interactions from the outside, by focusing on forces of 
continuity and change that originate in Europe's neighbourhood and other world 
regions. They add new empirical insights into the state of EU relationships with 
external powers and regions, from North America and China to Russia, Turkey and 
the Middle East. And they consider the challenges and opportunities that the EU 
needs to respond to if it is to develop a more effective global strategy.  
 
A question of agency: Policy options for Europe in a constrained external 
environment 
 
The third intention behind this special issue is to explore how the EU can react to the 
above challenges that have resulted from the dramatic deterioration in Europe’s 
external strategic environment. We are particularly interested in understanding 
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whether the EU is capable of developing a strategic response that is both realistic and 
actionable: Have domestic and international crises led to greater recognition among 
EU member states that a common approach in foreign policy is needed? How far do 
recent institutional innovations enable the EU to play a more effective role in 
Europe's external relations, and has the EU gained a capacity for independent 
strategic thinking and planning? In other words, do ongoing crises in Europe and 
abroad have the potential to ‘”transform” the EU as an international actor' (Müller 
2016, 370)?  
That the EU’s capacity to define and pursue foreign policy objectives has 
always been constrained is well understood in the research literature. From its early 
stages of development until today, the EU has been described as an incomplete power 
that lacks certain essential foreign policy instruments, such as independent military 
strength (Bull 1982), or as an emerging power that is held back by a gap between 
unrealistic expectations and insufficient capabilities (Hill 1993). Much has been made 
of the fact that EU foreign policy is only as good as the EU’s member states allow it 
to be. To be sure, considerable progress has been made in establishing an institutional 
framework for a common EU-wide foreign policy, from the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (1992) to the Common Security and Defense Policy (2003) and the 
creation of the European External Action Service (2010) (for an overview, see Smith 
2014). However, powerful member states have never reconciled themselves with the 
idea that the EU might gradually come to be the main external representative of the 
Union. Intergovernmentalism still reigns supreme in European foreign policy-making, 
and differences in national interests combined with persistent sovereignty reflexes 
continue to hamper the development of EU foreign policy capacity.  
External challenges such as the crises in the Ukraine and Syria have thus 
highlighted the structural weaknesses of European foreign policy. But crises can also 
serve as a wakeup call and may lead to renewed efforts at coordinating European 
foreign policy and strengthening EU-level institutions (Falkner 2016). Past crises in 
Europe have indeed been major triggers for new rounds of European integration, as 
neofunctionalist theories are keen to stress (Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015). The 
disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the 1990s and the wars among its successor 
states provided a major impetus for the developing CFSP instruments (Jopp et al. 
2009), while America’s assertive unilateralism in the early 2000s prompted the EU to 
reassert its support for a multilateral international order (contribution by Tocci). The 
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question thus arises as to whether the recent crises described above will act as 
catalysts on the road towards a more united and effective European presence in 
international affairs, or whether they end up pulling the rug from under the fragile 
edifice of European foreign policy.  
In the past, the debate on Europe’s constraints on international action focused 
on the unwillingness of member states to cede authority in favour of joint decision-
making and the weakness of EU-level institutions. More recently, the question of 
domestic support for European leadership in international affairs has increasingly 
entered the equation, particularly as the EU’s legitimacy crisis has deepened. Two 
major sources of popular discontent – concern over rising economic inequalities, and 
resistance to rapid social and cultural change – have combined to feed a populist 
uprising against national and European elites (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The 
Eurozone crisis that followed the 2008 global financial crisis marked a serious turning 
point in the way the European integration project has been viewed. The EU’s inability 
to solve the prolonged sovereign debt crisis and the economic malaise that Europe-
wide austerity measures inflicted have fuelled rising euroscepticism not just in in 
France, Italy, and Spain but also in Germany (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013). Anti-
European sentiment is now a firm part of the political programme of various populist 
parties that have capitalized on the continent’s economic woes. From France’s Front 
National (FN) to Germany’s Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) and Britain’s UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), right-wing populist parties have made the EU one of 
their main targets in their campaigns to defend national sovereignty against liberal 
cosmopolitanism.  
The UK’s EU referendum vote in June 2016 revealed just how damaging the 
rise of nationalist populism can be to European integration. The UK referendum result 
represents a decisive turning-point not only in British politics but potentially also in 
the history of European integration. While the outcome of the Brexit negotiations will 
not be known for some time, the threat of further exits from the EU has become more 
tangible. Of course, it is possible that the departure of a country that used to be 
described as Europe’s ‘awkward’ partner may yet reinvigorate the push for closer 
cooperation and integration among the EU-27 (Menon and Salter 2006, 1318). But a 
more likely, and worrying, outlook is for anti-European populism to gather strength 
across the continent and undermine efforts for a strengthening of EU-level decision-
making, including in foreign policy.  
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In the context of these external and internal challenges, the question of 
Europe’s ability to think and act in a strategic manner has assumed a new urgency. In 
the past, European capitals were able to outsource global strategic thinking and action 
to the United States. Today, with US willingness to provide global leadership waning 
and the transatlantic relationship coming under increasing strain, European leaders are 
called upon to leave behind what Menon and Howarth (2015) have described as 
‘collective strategic denial’ and formulate a vision of how the continent can 
collectively tackle emerging global challenges. Unlike the United States, which 
continues to benefit from a benign geographical position (Ikenberry 2014), Europe is 
far less likely to be insulated from direct threats to its territory from newly emerging 
security risks. Yet, existing responses among Europe’s foreign policy elite suggest 
continuing uncertainty over whether, and if so how, the EU can become the main 
vehicle for formulating and implementing a collective global strategy for Europe. The 
adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 suggests that, at a minimum, EU 
institutions are intent on forging such a strategic vision. But it remains far from clear 
whether the EU’s new strategy document can deliver on this promise. This special 
issue, which provides one of the first accounts and evaluations of the EUGS 
(contributions by Tocci and by Smith), addresses the question of Europe’s ability to 
act in the face of external changes and threats by focusing on the strategic responses 
that have emanated from Europe to date.  
 
Overview of the contributions to the special issue 
 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the relationship between Russia and the United 
States continues to have a critically important influence on Europe’s security 
environment. In the first contribution to the special issue, William Wohlforth and 
Vladislav Zubok examine the current impasse in relations between Russia and the 
West and how it affects Europe’s international position. The authors argue that due to 
structural forces at the level of the international system, the US and Russia are locked 
into a geopolitical conflict that requires pragmatic compromise between divergent 
interests. Russia’s global power aspiration is not just a passing fad but needs to be 
taken more seriously as the outgrowth of Russia’s predicament as a big country in a 
crowded and insecure geopolitical environment. This has clear implications for 
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Europe’s desire to stabilize relations with an increasingly revisionist Russia. As 
Wohlforth and Zubok argue, the path to a pragmatic partnership with Russia that 
enhances Europe’s security is steeper than commonly assumed.   
The second contribution by Brian Burgoon, Tim Oliver and Peter 
Trubowitz shifts the focus from the international structural context to the domestic 
basis of foreign policy-making. The authors examine the challenges that the 
transatlantic relationship faces in an era where domestic support for the goal of freer 
movement of capital, goods, services, and peoples across national boundaries is 
waning. Their contribution draws on a variety of indicators to show that the neoliberal 
economic agenda is proving increasingly unpopular in the US and Europe. Burgoon, 
Oliver and Trubowitz argue that the erosion of domestic support for globalization is 
closely linked to the rise of populist parties and movements, and that this shift in 
domestic politics has troubling consequences for the future of the transatlantic 
partnership and liberal international leadership. Both the UK’s Brexit vote and 
Donald Trump’s election victory suggest that Western democracies may well be 
approaching critical tipping points. 
In their article on ‘Europe and the Arab world’, Cilja Harders, Annette 
Jünemann and Lina Khatib investigate the dramatically changed context for 
Europe’s relationship with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The 
authors base their analysis on the ‘logics of action’ approach, which helps to identify 
structural and ideational patterns of behaviour against the background of an evolving 
regional and global order. They argue that, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 and especially after the Arab uprisings of 2011, the logics of stability and 
bilateralism have become dominant drivers of policy on both shores of the 
Mediterranean, leading to a securitization of Europe’s regional policies and pushing 
multilateral approaches aside. The EU has seen its influence in the region decline, and 
its long-standing desire to promote liberal and democratic values in the Arab world, a 
logic of action in its own right, has lost momentum. Arab regimes themselves are 
intensely focused on the logic of regime survival and have also prioritized 
bilateralism, both of which increasingly chime with European priorities. Harders, 
Jünemann and Khatib conclude with a critical reflection on the EU’s new global 
strategy of 2016, which they find to lack convincing answers to the challenges that the 
Arab region poses. Instead of offering a viable strategy of ‘principled pragmatism’, it 
is pragmatism without principles that, according to the authors, inform the EUGS.  
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Fuat Keyman’s contribution focuses on Turkey as the pivotal actor situated 
between Europe and the Middle East. Keyman discusses the various crises that have 
shaken Turkey to its core: the failed coup attempt of 2016 and the subsequent 
domestic crackdown; Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and fight against 
ISIS; and the refugee crisis that has seen millions of Syrians seek shelter in Turkey. 
The author traces the deterioration in relations between Turkey and Europe, arguing 
that on both sides trust and willingness to collaborate have been in decline for some 
time. Yet, as Keyman points out, Europe’s and Turkey’s future security are closely 
intertwined, and neither side can solve the various crises that they face on their own. 
Keyman welcomes the shift in Europe’s most recent foreign policy strategy towards 
the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’, which he sees as a potential basis for 
establishing a collaborative response to the unprecedented challenges that the era of 
global turmoil presents.  
Wiebke Rabe’s and Olivia Gippner’s contribution analyses changing 
dynamics in European-Chinese relations by focusing on how growing Chinese 
investment in European companies and infrastructure projects is viewed in both 
Europe and China. The authors examine two prominent case studies, the takeover of 
German robotics manufacturer KUKA AG and investment in Britain’s nuclear power 
project Hinkley Point C. Relying on a combination of media analysis and elite 
interviews with actors in China and Europe, the authors find that the rise in foreign 
direct investment flows by Chinese investors have created threat perceptions in the 
host countries, which in turn are leading to intensified efforts to develop regulatory 
processes that would protect strategically important or sensitive sectors. Europe may 
have focused in the past on developing deeper economic integration with China, but 
the gradual securitization of Chinese FDI is beginning to leave its mark on how 
individual investments by Chinese companies are perceived in key European markets.  
Nathalie Tocci offers the first of two analyses that focus on the European 
Union Global Strategy (EUGS), the EU’s new global strategy published in 2016. 
Having been closely involved in the creation of the document, the author offers an 
inside account of the deliberations and consultations that shaped the year-long 
drafting process. Tocci points out that, whereas the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS) was crafted in a relatively short period of a few weeks, the 2016 document had 
to go through a much more elaborate consultation process that included over 50 
events involving foreign policy experts and NGOs, foreign ministry representatives 
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from EU Member States and even representatives of non-EU countries. Tocci also 
traces the evolution of European strategic thinking from the ESS’s bold and optimistic 
notion of Europe as a transformative power to the more modest and realistic assertion 
of principled pragmatism in the EUGS. Unlike its predecessor, the new strategy of 
2016 eschews lofty visions in favour of actionable objectives. It is now for the 
European institutions and Member States to take the necessary measures to implement 
it.  
In the second contribution on the EU’s new global strategy, Karen Smith 
offers a critical assessment of the EUGS and asks whether it deserves the label of a 
strategy and how well it responds to newly emerging international challenges. Smith 
opens her analysis with a brief discussion of the essence of strategic thinking in 
international relations, which can be summed up as an attempt to combine foreign 
policy ends, ways and means. Based on this understanding of strategy, Europe’s past 
attempts at developing strategic documents, including for EU foreign policy, are 
found wanting. Smith argues that the EUGS itself represents a significant step 
forward in that it provides a more ‘realist’ guide for EU foreign and security policy in 
the near future. However, the author warns against hubristic optimism. Continuing 
internal divisions, combined with the UK’s decision to seek an exit from the EU, pose 
severe challenges for the implementation of Europe’s new strategy in an increasingly 
hostile international environment.  
In the final contribution to this special issue, Tim Oliver examines Britain’s 
referendum vote in favour of exiting the EU and the implications of a future Brexit for 
UK-European relations. As Oliver points out, resolving the question of how Britain 
can leave the EU involves not just one bilateral UK-EU negotiation but fourteen 
different sets of discussions and negotiations within the UK (about the respective 
powers and policies of the constituent parts of the UK political system), within the EU 
(about new balances of power between EU institutions and about the EU’s future 
external relations) and between the UK and EU (about EU withdrawal, transitional 
arrangements and future relationships). Rather than focusing on the inside perspective 
of the Brexit negotiations, Oliver argues that we need to pay closer attention to how 
the UK-EU relationship is interpreted by international actors (esp. USA, Russia, 
China) and how Brexit may alter those external perceptions. Such an outside-in 
perspective is needed to understand how major powers’ perceptions set the context in 
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